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Abstract 
 Using data for the period 2003-2010 of 164 industrial firms listed on 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (BIST-Borsa Istanbul), we empirically explore the 
impact of large shareholders on firm performance measured by ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. Empirical findings based on panel data analysis suggest that large 
shareholders have a significantly positive effect on the performance of the 
firms. In other words, the concentration of corporate ownership overcomes 
conflict of interest between the small shareholders and the managers. At the 
same time, in the case when share ownership of the large shareholder 
exceeds a certain level, once again, we find significant positive relation 
between large shareholders and firm performance. As a result, while we do 
not reject the validity of the efficient monitoring hypothesis, but rather the 
expropriating hypothesis in Turkey. 
 
Keywords: Large Shareholders, Agency Problem, Private Benefits of 
Control 
 
Introduction 
Concentrated ownership structure that gives rise to agency problems 
between large shareholders and any other stakeholders such as managers, 
workers, outside investors and creditors is of capital importance in terms of 
corporate governance. It is one of the most important variables that 
influences performance and hence value of firm. The relationship between 
concentrated ownership and performance of firm has received considerable 
attention and been intensely discussed in the corporate finance literature. The 
discussion dates back to the classic thesis of Berle & Means (1932). They 
claim that the relation between a publicly-held firm’s ownership structure 
and its performance should be negatively related. They argue that as a 
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publicly-held firm’s share ownership diffuses among a wide range of the 
small shareholders, control of the firm is delegated to professional managers 
and thereby the small shareholders are unable to effectively secure capital 
share of return on their investment. Additionally, they postulate when the 
goals of the small shareholders and professional managers do not coincide, 
professional managers may seek to maximize their own interest at the cost of 
the small shareholders. In this case, agency problems arise between the small 
shareholders who provide finance to the firm and the managers who have 
considerable discretion in running the firm. In other words, separation 
between ownership and control in publicly-held firms leads to agency 
problems stemming from incongruence between the small shareholders and 
the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Conflict of interest between the small shareholders and the managers 
is termed as principal-agent problem in the relevant literature. Many 
solutions have been advanced in the literature to mitigate this problem. In 
general, these solutions can be classified under two headings. The first one is 
internal corporate control mechanism (the board of directors, managerial 
shareholdings and concentrated ownership) and the second one is external 
corporate control mechanism (among others, laws and regulations, capital 
markets, labor and product/service markets). These mechanisms can be used 
to help align managers’ interests with those of the outside shareholders 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Kirchmaier & Grant, 
2005). The most simplest and direct mechanism of dealing with shareholder-
manager agency conflicts is internal corporate control mechanism in which 
shareholders take part in management using their voting rights and choose 
board of supervisors and thus can have an effect on managers of the firm. In 
this case, share ownership should be concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of large shareholders instead of a great number of small 
shareholders. Due to the fact that the large shareholders have stronger 
incentives and greater power to directly monitor managers' activities than the 
small shareholders, they can curb the conventional principal agent problems 
which Berle & Means (1932) identified. However, that share ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of the large shareholders could also arouse another 
kind of agency problem between the large shareholders and any other 
stakeholders. By this way, large shareholders may manipulate the firm and 
expropriate the small shareholders (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Ararat & Ugur, 2003; Hamadi, 2010; Abbas et al., 
2013). 
Although concentrated ownership is common in many developed 
countries (except the countries with Anglo-Saxon origin) and less developed 
countries, it is more pronounced in less developed countries. In other words, 
share ownership in less developed countries with a low degree of protection 
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of shareholders’ rights is much more concentrated than that of in developed 
countries with a high degree of protection of shareholders’ rights (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).  
We aim to empirically analyse that concentrated ownership by the 
large shareholders can remedy to which of the two agency problems that the 
small shareholders can be subjected in a less developed country, namely 
Turkey. In this purpose, we examine the relation between concentrated 
ownership and performance of firms listed in manufacturing industry on 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. Turkish firms provide an ideal setting to 
investigate each of agency problems. First of all, Turkey is a developing 
country where the level and quality of corporate governance and legal rules 
protecting both shareholders and creditors are very weak. Secondly, the 
majority of firms on Istanbul Stock Exchange exhibit highly concentrated 
ownership structures. In Turkey, even though firms are mostly controlled by 
the large shareholders like families, the Turkish government, foreign 
investors, institutional firms etc., the most important type of ownership is 
family ownership. 
In this study, a shareholder is "a large shareholder" if he directly or 
indirectly holds at least 10% of outstanding shares of the firm according to 
the widely accepted definitions in the literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Guney 
et al., 2006). We have categorized firms into three groups in terms of the 
stakes owned by the largest shareholder group. The levels of ownership are 
(0-10%), (10-50%) and (>=50%). They are represented by dummy variables 
in regression models. Thus we will find opportunities to examine how the 
variations in ownership level influence performance of the firms. Moreover, 
even though most previous studies assume concentrated ownership variable 
is an exogenous variable, we assume it as an endogenous variable in this 
study. This study aims to expand existing empirical knowledge on the impact 
of concentrated ownership on firm performance. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no research by this time to have modeled the relation 
between the levels of ownership and firm performance for Turkish firms.  
The rest of the study unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides previous 
research and hypotheses development. Section 3 summarizes the data and 
includes descriptive statistics. We also give a detailed description of the 
variables used in the study. Section 4 presents the model specification and 
the empirical findings. In the final section, we give the general conclusions 
that can be drawn from the findings of our study and suggestions for future 
studies. 
2. Previous research and hypotheses development 
Empirical findings from the previous studies that examined the 
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance are 
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mixed. For example, Wiwattanakantang (2001) investigates the relationship 
between controlling shareholders and company value, measured by Tobin’s 
Q, ROA and sales-assets ratio by using a sample of 270 non-financial firms 
listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in the year 1996. She defines 
‘‘controlling shareholders” as an entity that holds at least 25% shares of the 
firms. To take into account the possibility that variation in the levels of 
ownership influences corporate performance, companies are categorized into 
four groups (less than 25%, 25–50%, 50-75%, 75–100%) according to the 
shares held by the largest shareholder group. In addition to this, companies 
where controlling shareholders participate in management are also 
categorized into four groups according to the shares held by controlling 
shareholders involved in management. Findings obtained from the regression 
models reveal two different results in terms of expropriation hypothesis. The 
first one indicates that the large shareholders at each ownership levels are 
positively linked to corporate performance, measured by ROA and sales–
asset ratio and the hypothesis that the large shareholders expropriate minority 
shareholders is not valid. But, the second one shows that when the large 
shareholders are involved in the management and hold (25–50%) of the 
shares of the company, the large shareholders’ involved in the management 
is negatively linked to corporate performance, measured by ROA and sales–
asset ratio. This negative relationship suggests that the hypothesis of private 
benefit of control by the large shareholders works in Thailand.  
Onder (2003) studied the relation between the concentrated 
ownership and performance of all the corporations listed on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) in Turkey between 1995 and 2006. On her study, she 
employed ROA and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables and measured 
ownership concentration according to the percentage of shares held by 
public, the largest shareholders and three largest shareholders. Her results 
based on OLS show that there is no significant relation between measures of 
ownership concentration and ROA, while there is a quadratic relation 
between ownership concentration and firm market performance, measured 
by Tobin’s Q. A quadratic relationship between concentration by the largest 
shareholder and Tobin’s Q is positive when the small shareholders own less 
than half of the shares of the firm. In a study using a dataset of 185 Turkish 
industrial companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) for the 
period of 1992-1998, Gonenc (2006) investigates the effect of ownership 
concentration measured by the percentage of shares owned by the three 
largest shareholders and managerial ownership measured by the percentage 
of shares owned by management on the company performance, modeling the 
ownership structure as an endogenous variable. Both ROA and market-to-
book ratio have been used as performance variables in the analysis. He uses a 
simultaneous equations framework to explain ownership-performance 
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relationship. Regression results using the method of OLS, in which 
ownership concentration is assumed to be exogenous, suggest that there is a 
reverse causation between ownership concentration and market performance 
of the company. However, his findings obtained from 2SLS (Two Stages 
Least Squares) regression, considering the endogeneity of ownership 
structure indicate that accounting performance of the company has 
significantly negative effect on ownership concentration.   
Alonso-Bonis & Andrés-Alonso (2007), who studied the influence of 
ownership concentration on firm performance, chose a sample of 101 
Spanish non-financial firms listed on the Madrid exchange market. Their 
analysis covers the period from 1991 to 1997. In order to analyse the relation 
between ownership structure and firm performance, they considered two 
measures with regard to ownership structure variables, i.e. the fraction of 
stakes held by the largest shareholders and the fraction of stakes held by the 
directors and used Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. After 
applying panel data methodology to control for the endogeneity of ownership 
structure, results obtained from the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
show that there is a positive and significant relation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. 
Chen et al. (2005) investigated a sample of 412 publicly listed Hong 
Kong firms for the period of 1995–1998. They employed three performance 
measures i.e. ROA, ROE and market-to-book ratio and the fraction of total 
company shares outstanding held by the controlling family for ownership 
concentration. As a result, they conclude that the family ownership has no 
significant positive effect on performance measures. In contrast, using panel 
data on 275 German exchage-listed firms listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
for the period of 1998-2004, Andres (2008) examines the relation between 
the large owners and firm performance. After seperating the family 
companies from other companies in terms of block holders using a family 
dummy variable, he finds that family companies perform better than 
companies with a small number of controlling shareholders or widely held 
companies in the case when they both control shareholders and manage the 
firm.  He highlights that family firms can solve each of the two agency 
problems that the small shareholders are subjected to only under certain 
condition. 
Mandaci & Gumus (2010) conducted a study on 203 non-financial 
firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in the year 2005. On their study, 
they used ROA and Tobin’s Q rates as dependent variables and ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership as independent variables. Their 
findings indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance measures, while the relationship 
between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q is significant and negative. 
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Wellalage & Locke (2012) explore the relationship between ownership 
structure (insider, institutional and local ownership) and performance of 
firms for a sample of 152 firms listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri 
Lanka. They use panel data from 2004 to 2009 and ROA and Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for firm performance. In order to analyze how level of insider 
ownership affect company performance, insider ownership variable is 
categorised as 4 groups (0%, 0-30%, 30-70%, 70-100%) according to 
percentage of insider ownership. While GMM regression results show that 
there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate performance, this relationship is more positive and significant. 
Pervan, Pervan & Todoric (2012) investigate the effects of ownership 
structure and company performance measured by ROA, using data of listed 
Croatian firms from the Zagreb during the period from 2003 to 2010.  
Empirical results based on GMM show ownership concentration measured 
by concentration ratio of the four largest shareholders have a significantly 
negative effect on company performance. In other words, Croatian listed 
firms suggest that more concentrated ownership results in lower company 
performance.  Using the data on all the listed Pakistani companies for the 
period of 2006–2009, Abbas, Naqvi & Mirza (2013) find a positive 
relationship between concentrated owners assumed to be exogenous and firm 
performance, measured by accounting measures such as ROA and ROE. 
However, when ownership concentration of the large shareholders exceeds 
50%, the relation between concentrated owners and firm performance 
becomes negative.  
As can be understood from the explanation above, it can be 
mentioned that there are two main hypotheses based on agency problems. 
According to the first one, concentrated ownership may minimize the agency 
problems which appear between the small shareholders and the managers of 
the firm. Hence, concentrated ownership may have a positive effect on firm 
performance because of the monitoring effect. As to the other one, when 
ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, it can bring about private 
benefits to the large shareholders and they may easily enjoy private benefits 
of control at the cost of the small shareholders’ interest or any other 
stakeholders because of the expropriation effect. In this situation, positive 
relation between ownership concentration and firm performance may 
disappear and firm performance decreases (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Stiglitz, 
1985; Grossman & Hart, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Yurtoglu, 2000; 
Kirchmaier & Grant, 2005; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Hu & Izumida, 2008; 
Hamadi, 2010). These lead us to test the following hypotheses: 
H1. The presence of the large shareholders is positively related to 
firm performance. 
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H2. The ownership of the large shareholders at higher level has 
negative effect on firm performance. 
3. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Variables 
We analyze a sample of an unbalanced panel of 164 listed Turkish 
firms of manufacturing sector over the period 2003 to 2010. The yearly 
financial tables of the industrial firms provided by the official web site of 
Istanbul Stock Exchange are employed as the source for data. Table 1 reports 
the descriptive statistics for the sample data. The mean value for 
concentrated ownership by the largest shareholder is 48.57%. The 
concentrated ownership (CO) of the largest shareholder ranges from 99.28% 
to 0. 006%. The results for the mean value for concentrated ownership are 
similar to Yurtoglu (2000), Demirag and Serter (2003) and Mandaci & 
Gumus (2010). In their study they reported that an average concentrated 
ownership by the largest shareholders was at 44.12%, 48.25%, and 45.10% 
respectively. Consequently, we can say that the ownership structure of 
Turkish industrial firms is highly concentrated in the hands of large 
shareholders. Tobin’s Q as a market-based performance measure has a mean 
of about 1.27. Mean value of the return on assets (ROA) as an accounting-
based performance measure is 0.03. The control variables, log of sales and 
percentage of debt to equity are also listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max N 
TQ 1.267667 1.06136 1.008723 0.2927408 13.48961 1204 
ROA 0.0303373 0.0319889 0.1110014 -0.830685 0.8690543 1207 
SIZ 5.247587 5.179534 1.473732 2.055405 9.540939 1207 
LEV 1.325931 0.7735195 1.820921 0.0062431 25.02 1206 
CO 0.4857273 0.4867 0.229838 0.006 0.9928 1205 
CO1 0.9560895 1 0.204981 0 1 1207 
CO2 0.4739022 0 0.4995254 0 1 1207 
CO3 0.4821872 0 0.4998897 0 1 1207 
 
Firm performance as a dependent variable is measured with Return 
on Assets (ROA), a measure of firm profitability and Tobin’s Q, a market-
based measure of the value of the firm. ROA is defined as net profit divided 
by total assets and Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus total 
debt to total assets. We use three independent variables as ownership 
variables. These are dummy variables that take value of 1 or 0 according to 
levels of ownership by large shareholders. As for control variables, they are 
firm size and leverage. Firm size is natural logarithm of total sales and 
leverage is debt to equity ratio. All variables used in this study and their 
definitions can be referred from Table 2. 
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Table 2: Description and Symbol of Variables Used in This Study 
 
Variables Description Symbol 
Performance Measures   
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets ROA 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus total debt to total 
assets 
TQ 
Independent Variables   
Ownership Variables   
Existence of the large 
shareholder 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
firm has a large shareholder, otherwise 0. 
CO1 
The large shareholder holds 
(0.10-0.50) 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
large shareholder has (0.10-0.50%) of the 
firms’s shares, otherwise 0. 
CO2 
The large shareholder holds 
(0.50-1.00) 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
large shareholder has 0.50 % or more than 
0.50 % of the firms’s shares, otherwise 0. 
CO3 
Control Variables   
Size Natural logarithm of sales SIZ 
Debt to Equity Ratio Percentage of debt to equity LEV 
 
4. Model Specification and Empirical Findings 
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the the possible impact of 
concentrated ownership on firm performance based on panel data analysis. 
Concentrated ownership by the large shareholdeers is assumed to be 
endogenous in this study. When we research percentage changes in 
ownership structure of the Turkish firms over the period 2003-2010, we see 
that percentage of stock ownership by the large shareholders varies over the 
time. Thus the large shareholders may change their holdings of stock based 
on prospects about future performance of firms. In other words, if they have 
better information than market, they may increase or decrease their holdings 
of stock in advance, in their prospects of good or bad performance of firms. 
In this case, stock ownership of large shareholder may be endogenously 
determined by performance of firm (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gonenc, 2006). When 
considering that concentrated ownership is an endogenous variable, the 
estimators of static panel data models (fixed effects or random effects 
estimators) to estimate coefficient in our models are not appropriate. The 
point to be emphasized here is that these estimators do not assume the 
potential endogeneity between dependent and independent variables and they 
can seriously produce biased coefficients (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, we 
decide to employ the dynamic panel data models to deal with endogeneity 
problem between both variables. The system GMM estimator developed for 
dynamic panel models by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) 
is a typically used technique that enables us to control for problems of 
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endogeneity stemming from unobservable heterogeneity, reverse causality, 
simultaneity and also past performance (Blundell and Bond 1998; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006; Guney et al., 2006; Wintoki et al., 2012). The dynamic 
models for which a lagged performance variable is included as one of the 
explanatory variables to empirically test our two hypotheses are shown 
below: 
PERi,t = β0 + β1 (PER)i,t-1 + β2 (SIZ)i,t + β3 (LEV)i, t + β4 (OC1)i,t  
                  + β5 (YEAR)t + ui + εi,t,                                                             (1) 
PERi,t = β0 + β1 (PER)i,t-1 + β2 (SIZ)i,t + β3 (LEV)i,t + β4 (OC2)i,t 
                      + β5 (OC3)i,t + β6 (YEAR)t + ui + εi,t,                                       (2) 
Where i denotes the firm number (N=170), t denotes the number of 
the years (T=8). The β parameters are the coefficients to be estimated. 
YEAR is a set of dummy variables for each year (2003-2010), u is the 
unobserved, time invariant and fixed-effect for firm i, ε is an unobserved 
disturbance term, which is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (iid). The definition of the variables in the regression equations is 
summarized in Table 2. When sample size is small, asymptotic standard 
errors obtained from two-step system GMM estimator can be severely 
downward biased (Blundell and Bond 1998). Since our sample size is not 
very large, the models are estimated by two-step system GMM with the 
Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors.  
Table 3 presents the two-step system GMM estimation results of 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) when the dependent variable is one of the 
performace measures i.e. the return on assets (ROA) or Tobin’s Q, 
respectively. The diagnostics statistics of GMM estimations for both 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) are also provided at the bottom of the Table 3. 
The diagnostics statistics in Table 3 indicate that the models we used to 
estimate the relationship between concentrated ownership and performance 
are well fitted with statistically insignificant test statistics for both the 
Hansen J-test and AR(2) test, that is, the Hansen J-test for overidentification 
restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that instruments used in our 
regression equations are valid or are not correlated with errors and the AR(2) 
test does not reject the null hypothesis that error term in the first difference 
regression exhibits no second-order serial correlation. The results of F test 
for the joint significance of independent variables indicate that the model 
specifications are convincing. The point to be emphasized here is that the 
presence of first order serial correlation AR(1) does not mean that the 
estimations are inconsistent. Moreover, the coefficients on the lagged 
performance variables are significant at the 1% level for all four models. 
This finding confirms that the dynamics implied by our models are not 
rejected.  
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We employ ROA in models 1 and 2 and Tobin’s Q in models 3 and 4 
as performance measures. In models 1 and 3, we use CO1 dummy variable 
which shows that share ownership of large shareholder is more than or equal 
to 10% in order to research whether “efficient monitoring hypothesis” works 
in the context of Turkey or not. The estimated coefficient for CO1 dummy 
variable is positively and statistically significant at the 5% and the 10% 
levels and this indicates that the existence of the large shareholders increases 
performance, especially regarding the accounting measure of firm 
performance. In other words, firms with large shareholders are significantly 
more profitable than firms with no large shareholders.  
In models 2 and 4, we employ CO2 dummy variable indicating share 
ownership of large shareholder is between 10-50% and CO3 dummy variable 
suggesting share ownership of large shareholder is 50% or more than 50%. 
Our aim to use these two dummy variables is to examine whether 
"expropriating hypothesis" is valid in Turkey or not by comparing the 
performance of firms whose share ownership of large shareholder is less than 
10% with the performance of firms whose share ownership of large 
shareholders is between 10-50% and with the performance of firms whose 
share ownership of large shareholders is 50% or more than 50%. The 
estimated coefficients on CO2 and CO3 variables are positive and 
significant.  This indicates that higher levels of ownership by large 
shareholders increase performance of the firm. This result suggests that firms 
with large shareholder levels of the (0.10-0.50%) and the (>=0.50) have 
higher ROA relative to firms whose share ownership of the large shareholder 
is less than 10%. In terms of control variables, SİZE has a significant 
positive effect on ROA and a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q in all 
four models. The other factor that affects ROA is debt to equity ratio. The 
coefficient on LEV variable in models 1, 2 and 4 is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
The results are similar to Wiwattanakantang (2001), who finds that 
controlling shareholders is positively and significantly associated with firm 
performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q using data on 270 non-
financial firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. These findings, 
however, are different from the findings of Yurtoglu (2000), who uses data 
of 126 manufacturing Turkish firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
He finds that concentrated ownership by the largest shareholders is 
negatively related to firm performance measured by ROA.  
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Table 3: Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation, Two-Step System GMM 
     ROA                    ROA                  Tobin’s Q           Tobin’s Q 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CO1 0.6255522** 
[0.2829712] 
(2.21) 
 
 
1.648109* 
[0.870336] 
(1.89) 
 
 
CO2  0.3763941* 
[0.2242445] 
(1.68) 
 4.156606* 
[2.193992] 
(1.89) 
CO3  0.4744163* 
[0.2642802] 
(1.80) 
 5.645303** 
[2.378463] 
(2.37) 
SIZE 0.0208642* 
[0.0113892] 
(1.83) 
0.0256378** 
[0.0102248] 
(2.51) 
-1.029612** 
[0.4657919] 
(-2.21) 
-0.6876548** 
[0.2949996] 
(-2.33) 
LEV -0.1012118*** 
[0.0322144] 
(-3.14) 
-0.0998792*** 
[0.0311181] 
(-3.21) 
-0.1072219 
[0.1779734] 
(-0.60) 
-0.2365225** 
[0.1151326] 
(-2.05) 
PER (-1) -0.7113013*** 
[0.2070654] 
(-3.44) 
-0.6069063*** 
[0.1344202] 
(-4.51) 
0.4828834*** 
[0.1225575] 
(3.94) 
0.3504132*** 
[0.1322534] 
(2.65) 
Intercept -0.5238103** 
[0.2394786] 
(-2.19) 
-0.3953853* 
[0.2244513] 
(-1.76) 
5.212394** 
[2.336466] 
(2.23) 
0.5746856 
[3.0201] 
(0.19) 
Regression Diagnostics 
F test statistics 6.84 (0.000) 10.11 (0.000) 19.06 (0.000) 10.32 (0.000) 
AR(1) statistics -1.91(0.056) -1.65 (0.098) -1.66 (0.096) -2.05 (0.040) 
AR(2) statistics 0.36 (0.719) 0.27 (0.788) 1.56 (0.118) 1.45 (0.146) 
Hansen J-statistics 15.85 (0.392) 33.00 (0.418) 16.09 (0.376) 52.55 (0.268) 
Observations 971 971 1032 1032 
Note: We report the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) 
finite sample correction for standard errors (reported in square brackets). The t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. Each model includes a set of dummy variables for each year but the 
results are not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, 164 industrial firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(BIST-Borsa Istanbul) for the period of 2003-2010 are used to empirically 
analyze the impact of large shareholders on firm performance measured by 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. Concentrated ownership by the large shareholders is 
assumed to be endogenous in our study and GMM estimator is used. 
According to our findings from our panel data analysis, we fail to reject the 
validity of the efficient monitoring hypothesis (fail to reject H1) and reject 
the validity of expropriating hypothesis (reject H2) in Turkey. Since we fail 
to reject the first hypothesis, we can mention that the increase in shares of 
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large shareholders in the firm motivates better monitoring of managers. 
Since we reject the second hypothesis, we can comment that ownership of 
large shareholders at higher level does not have negative effect on firm 
performance. This result indicates that the large shareholders do not generate 
private benefits at the cost of the small shareholders. 
Since the presence of large shareholder improves the firm 
performance, in a firm with small shareholders, the existing shareholders 
may choose to be financed by a large shareholder rather than selling shares 
on stock exchange to many different shareholders. Lack of large shareholder 
can even jeopardize the existence of the firm apart from decrease in firm 
performance. For example, in Turkey it is seen that managers may take 
riskier decisions (such as writing cheques more than usual) since shareholder 
can lose his investment however the managers may lose their jobs at most. 
According to these results, regulators may support large ownership in firms 
rather than small ownership because improved firm performances in the 
country may benefit the economy in a more positive way. The firm with 
improved performance can pay higher taxes, can employ more employees 
and may export to foreign countries and get foreign currency to the 
economy. Since most of the family owned firms are aware of the risks by 
delegating more responsibility to the management, they especially control 
critical activities such as making long term investments, writing cheques 
above a threshold. Shareholders can give options to management for buying 
shares at favorable rates in the future and give yearly bonus in order to align 
the motivation of managers with the motivation of shareholders. 
In future studies, different criteria for firm value such as EVA, MVA 
etc. can be used in the analysis and the results can be commented. The 
impact of the shareholding status of family owned firms can be analyzed in 
deeper form. 
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